our commerce without countenance or aid, they scattered themselves over
the wide surface of the ocean, penetrated to the most remote seas,
everywhere acting with the most brilliant success against the enemy's
navigation. And we believe, moreover, that in the amount of the enemy's
property thus destroyed, of American property protected or recovered,
and in the number of hostile ships kept in pursuit of our scattered
vessels, ships evaded if superior, and beaten if equal--they rendered
benefits a thousand-fold greater, to say nothing of the glory they
acquired for the nation, and the character they imparted to it, than any
that would have resulted from a state of passiveness within the harbors.
Confident that this is the true policy as regards the employment of the
navy proper, we doubt not that it will in the future be acted on, as it
has been in the past; and that the results, as regards both honor and
advantage, will be expanded commensurately with its own enlargement. In
order, however, that the navy may always assume and maintain that active
and energetic deportment, in offensive operations, which is at the same
time so consistent with its functions, and so consonant with its spirit,
we have shown that it must not be occupied with mere coast defence."

A few remarks on the relative cost of ships and forts, and the economy
of their support, and we will close this discussion. We do not regard
this question, however, as a matter of any great importance, for it can
seldom be decisive in the choice of these two means of defence. No
matter what their relative cost may be, the one cannot often be
substituted for the other. There are some few cases, however, where this
might be taken into consideration, and would be decisive. Let us
endeavor to illustrate our meaning. For the defence of New York city,
the Narrows and East River must be secured by forts; ships cannot, in
this case, be substituted. But let us suppose that the _outer_ harbor of
New York furnishes no favorable place for the debarkation of troops, or
that the place of debarkation is so far distant that the troops cannot
reach the city before the defensive forces can be prepared to repel
them. This outer harbor would be of great importance to the enemy as a
shelter from storms, and as a place of debarkation or of rendezvous
preparatory to a forcible passage of the Narrows; while to us its
possession would not be absolutely essential, though very important.
Strong