absolutely dependent upon the security of the Narrow Seas, and
that security was being menaced owing to the enemy having laid his
grip upon Ostend and Zeebrugge. One afternoon in the autumn of 1915
Admiral Bacon of the Dover Patrol, who believed in an extremely active
defence, came to see me and we had a long and interesting
conversation. He was full of a scheme for running some ship-loads of
troops right into Ostend harbour at night and landing the men by
surprise about the mole and the docks. His plans were not, however, at
this time worked out so elaborately, nor had such effective
preparations been taken in hand with regard to them, as was the case
at a later date after Sir D. Haig had taken up command of the B.E.F.
The Admiral describes these preparations and his developed plans in
_The Dover Patrol_.

On the occasion of this talk in the War Office, Admiral Bacon was, if
I recollect aright, contemplating landing the troops straight off the
ordinary type of vessel, not off craft especially designed and
constructed for the particular purpose, as was intended in his
improved project. Nor was it, I think, proposed to use "beetles"
(these may perhaps all have gone to the Mediterranean). My impression
at the time was that the scheme had very much to recommend it in
principle, but that its execution as it stood must represent an
extremely hazardous operation of war. Nor was this a moment when one
felt much leaning towards new-fangled tactical and strategical
devices, for we had a large force locked up under most depressing
conditions in the Gallipoli Peninsula, we were apparently going to be
let in for trouble in Macedonia, and, although the United Kingdom and
the Dominions had by this time very large forces under arms, a
considerable proportion of the troops could hardly be looked upon as
efficient owing to lack of training.

Looking at this question of the Flanders littoral from what, in a
naval and military sense, may be called the academical point of view,
it is certainly a great pity that neither the project worked out by
Admiral Bacon in the winter of 1915-16 in agreement with G.H.Q., nor
yet the later plan for conjunct operations to take place in this coast
region had the Passchendael offensive of 1917 not been so disastrously
delayed, was put into execution. Had either of them actually been
carried out this must, whatever the result was, have provided one of
the most dramatic and remarkable incidents in the cour