an only be explained in the supposition that he really believed
that Jackson had fled to Gordonsville, and that the demonstrations
on his front and right proceeded merely from Stuart's cavalry; and
yet why any one should suppose that Lee would part with half his
army, and send it away to Gordonsville where there was no enemy
and nothing to be done, is more than I can imagine. Jackson was
celebrated for making these turning movements; besides, it was
easy, by questioning prisoners, to verify the fact that he had no
surplus trains with him. Nothing, in short, but ammunition wagons,
and ambulances for the wounded; a sure indication that his movement
meant fight and not retreat.

From 10 A.M., when Hooker's order was received, to 6 P.M., when
the assault came, there was ample time for Howard to form an
impregnable line. His division commanders did not share his
indifference. General Schurz pointed out to him that his flank
was in the air, but he seemed perfectly satisfied with his line as
it was, and not at all desirous of changing it in any particular.
Schurz, of his own volition, without the knowledge of his chief,
posted three regiments in close column of division, and formed them
in the same direction as the two regiments and two guns which were
expected to keep Jackson back, but the shock, when it came, was so
sudden that these columns did not have time to deploy. Devens,
having two reserve regiments, also faced them that way, of his own
accord, behind the other two, but having no encouragement to form
line in that direction it is probable both generals hesitated to
do so.

Jackson, having debouched from the country road into the plank
road, was separated from Lee by nearly six miles of pathless forest.
He kept on until he reached the turnpike, and then halted his
command in order that he might reconnoitre and form line of battle.
He went up on a high hill and personally examined the position of
the Eleventh Corps. Finding that it was still open to attack, and
that no preparations had been made to receive him, he formed Rodes'
and Colston's divisions two hundred yards apart, perpendicular to
the plank road, with the road in the centre, and with Hill's division
both on the plank road and turnpike as a support to the other two.
Fitz Lee's brigade of cavalry was left on the plank road to menace
Howard from that direction.

It will be seen by a glance at the map that his lines overlapped
that of the Eleventh Cor