on was to move along the
eastern base of the Blue Ridge directly toward Washington.* The
appearance of his army on Hooker's flank would be a kind of taunt
and threat, calculated to draw the latter out of his shell, and
induce him to make an attack. In such a case, as the rebels were
in the highest spirits, in consequence of their recent victory at
Chancellorsville, their commander had little doubt of the result.
This plan was feasible enough, provided his cavalry could beat back
that of Pleasonton and act as a screen to conceal his movements.
This they were not in a condition to do after the battle of Brandy
Station, and Lee was thus forced to take the route down the Shenandoah
Valley, which had many advantages. The mountain wall that intervened
between the two armies, was a sure defence against our forces, for
it was covered by dense thickets, and the roads that lead through
the gaps, and the gaps themselves, were easy to fortify and hold
against a superior force. If Hooker had attempted to assail these
positions, one corps could have held him in check, while the other
two captured Washington.
[* See map facing page 1.]
The movement also favored the subsistence of the troops, for the
valley being a rich agricultural region, Lee was enabled to dispense
with much of his transportation and feed his army off the country.
There was one serious obstacle, however, to his further progress
in that direction, and that was the presence of a gallant soldier,
Milroy, with a very considerable Union garrison intrenched at
Winchester.
It was essential to Lee's advance that the valley should be cleared
of Union troops, otherwise they would sally forth after he passed
and capture his convoys.
With this object in view, on the 10th Ewell's corps passed through
Gaines' Cross Roads, and halted near Flint Hill on their way to
Chester Gap and Front Royal.
The possibility of an invasion had been discussed for some days in
Washington, and Halleck had come to the conclusion that it was
better to withdraw the stores and ammunition from Winchester, and
retain the post there merely as a lookout, to give warning of the
enemy's approach. Accordingly, on the 11th, Milroy received orders
from his department commander, General Schenck, to send his armament
and supplies back to Harper's Ferry. Milroy remonstrated, saying
that he could hold the place against any force that would probably
attack him, and that it would be cruel to sacri
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