e, as my regiments were reduced to the size of
companies.

Hancock was much pleased with the ridge we were on, as a defensive
position, and considered it admirably adapted for a battle-field.
Its gentle slopes for artillery, its stone fences and rocky boulders
to shelter infantry, and its ragged but commanding eminences on
either flank, where far-reaching batteries could be posted, were
great advantages. It covered the principal roads to Washington
and Baltimore, and its convex shape, enabling troops to reinforce
with celerity any point of the line from the centre, or by moving
along the chord of this arc, was probably the cause of our final
success. The enemy, on the contrary, having a concave order of
battle, was obliged to move troops much longer distances to support
any part of his line, and could not communicate orders rapidly,
nor could the different corps co-operate promptly with each other.
It was Hancock's recommendation that caused Meade to concentrate
his army on this ridge, but Howard received the thanks of Congress
for selecting the position. He, doubtless, did see its advantages,
and recommended it to Hancock. The latter immediately took measures
to hold it as a battle-ground for the army, while Howard merely
used the cemetery as a rallying point for his defeated troops.
Hancock occupied all the prominent points, and disposed the little
cavalry and infantry he had in such a way as to impress the enemy
with the idea that heavy reinforcements had come up. By occupying
Culp's Hill, on the right, with Wadsworth's brigade, and posting
the cavalry on the left to take up a good deal of space, he made
a show of strength not warranted by the facts. Both Hill and Ewell
had received some stunning blows during the day, and were disposed
to be cautious. They, therefore, did not press forward and take
the heights, as they could easily have done at this time, but not
so readily after an hour's delay, for then Sickles' corps from
Emmetsburg, and Slocum's corps from Two Taverns, began to approach
the position. The two rebel divisions of Anderson and Johnson,
however, arrived about dusk, which would have still given the enemy
a great numerical superiority.

General Lee reached the field before Hancock came, and watched the
retreat of the First and Eleventh Corps, and Hancock's movements
and dispositions through his field-glass. He was not deceived by
this show of force, and sent a recommendation--not an order--t