ard with
his brigade, moved too far to the right, and Crawford ordered him
to change front and advance toward Round Top. He did so and struck
a rebel brigade in flank which was behind a temporary breastwork
of rails, sods, etc. When this brigade saw a Union force apparently
approaching from their own lines to attack them in flank, they
retreated in confusion, after a short resistance, and this disorder
extended during the retreat to a reserve brigade posted on the low
ground in their rear. Their flight did not cease until they reached
Horner's woods, half a mile distant, where they immediately intrenched
themselves. These brigades belonged to Hood's division, then under
Law.

Longstreet says, "When this (Pickett's) charge failed, I expected
that, of course, the enemy would throw himself against our shattered
ranks and try to crush us. I sent my staff officers to the rear
to assist in rallying the troops, and hurried to our line of
batteries as the only support that I could given them." . . . "I
knew if the army was to be saved these batteries must check the
enemy." . . . "For unaccountable reasons the enemy did not pursue
his advantage."

Longstreet always spoke of his own men as invincible, and stated
that on the 2d they did the best three hours' fighting that ever
was done, but Crawford's* attack seemed to show that they too were
shaken by the defeat of Picket's grand charge.

[* Crawford was also one of those who took a prominent part in the
defence of Fort Sumter, at the beginning of the war. We each
commanded detachments of artillery on that occasion.]

In regard to the great benefit we would have derived from a pursuit,
it may not be out of place to give the opinion of a few more
prominent Confederate officers.

Colonel Alexander, Chief of Longstreet's artillery, says in a
communication to the "Southern Historical Papers":

"I have always believed that the enemy here lost the greatest
opportunity they ever had of routing Lee's army by a prompt offensive.
They occupied a line shaped somewhat like a horseshoe. I suppose
the greatest diameter of this horseshoe was not more than one mile,
and the ground within was entirely sheltered from our observation
and fire, with communications by signals all over it, and they
could concentrate their whole force at any point and in a very
short time without our knowledge. Our line was an enveloping semi-
circle, over four miles in development, and communication f