erate
scout with a despatch from Jefferson Davis to General Lee, in which
the former wrote of the exposed condition of Richmond owing to the
presence of a large Union force at City Point. Dahlgren said a
retreat had been ordered, but when Meade read this despatch, he
looked upon it as a sign indicating the weakness of the enemy, and
perhaps thinking it would not do to supplement the probable capture
of Richmond by a retreat of the Army of the Potomac, countermanded
the order. Sedgwick, who was high in the confidence of General
Meade, told one of his division commanders that the army would
probably fall back on Westminster. General Pleasonton testifies
that he was engaged, by order of General Meade, until 11 P.M. in
occupying prominent points with his cavalry, to cover the retreat
of the army. Nevertheless it has been indignantly denied that such
a movement was contemplated.

Although it was General Lee's intention that both flanks of the
Union army should be assailed at the same time, while the intermediate
forces made demonstrations against the centre, Ewell did not move
to attack the right of our line at Culp's Hill until Longstreet's
assault on the left had failed. Longstreet attributes it to the
fact that Ewell had broken his line of battle by detaching two
brigades up the York road. There is always some reason why columns
never converge in time. Johnson's division, which was on the
extreme left of the rebel army, and had not been engaged, made
their way, sheltered by the ravine of Rock Creek, to assail the
right at Culp's Hill, held by Wadsworth's division of the First
Corps, and that part of the line still farther to the right where
Geary's division of the Twelfth Corps was posted.

In his desire to reinforce the Fifth Corps at the close of the
conflict with Longstreet, General Meade made the sad mistake of
ordering the Twelfth Corps to abandon its position on the right
and report to General Sykes for duty on the left. General Slocum,
sensible that this would be a suicidal movement, reported that the
enemy were advancing on his front, and begged permission to keep
Geary's division there to defend the position. General Meade
finally allowed him to retain Greene's brigade, and no more, and
thus it happened that Ewell's troops, finding the works on the
extreme right of our line defenceless, had nothing to do but walk
in and occupy them. If Meade was determined to detach this large
force, there seems no