ted to resist the shock very long, and reinforcements
became absolutely necessary to sustain that unlucky angle at the
Peach Orchard. Sickles had authority to call on Sykes, whose corps
was resting from a long and fatiguing march, but the latter wished
his men to get their coffee and be refreshed before sending them
in; and as those who are fighting almost always exaggerate the
necessity for immediate reinforcements, Sykes thought Sickles could
hold on a while longer, and did not respond to the call for three-
quarters of an hour.
It would seem that Lee supposed that Meade's main line of battle
was on the Emmetsburg pike, and that the flank rested on the Peach
Orchard, for he ordered Longstreet to form Hood's division
perpendicular to that road, whereas Sickles occupied an advanced
line, and Sykes the main line in rear. McLaws says that Lee thought
turning the Peach Orchard was turning the Union left. With this
idea, he directed Longstreet to form across the Emmetsburg road,
and push our troops toward Cemetery Hill. Kershaw, after the minor
ridge was taken, reported to Longstreet that he could not carry
out these orders without exposing his right flank to an attack from
Sykes' corps.
Ward fought bravely against Benning's and Anderson's brigades on
the left, driving back two attacks of the latter, but his line was
long and weak, and the enemy overlapped it by the front of nearly
two brigades. Being concealed from view, from the nature of the
ground they could concentrate against any point with impunity. He
attempted to strengthen his forces at the Devil's Den by detaching
the 99th Pennsylvania from his right, and, although De Trobriand
had no troops to spare, he was directed by General Birney to send
the 40th New York, under Colonel Egan, to reinforce that flank.
Egan arrived too late to perform the duty assigned to him, as Ward
had been already driven back, but not too late to make a gallant
charge upon the rebel advance.
The fighting soon extended to the Peach Orchard, but as it commenced
on the left, we will describe that part of the engagement first.
General Warren, who was on Meade's staff as Chief Engineer, had
ridden about this time to the signal station on Little Round Top,
to get a better view of the field. He saw the long line of the
enemy approaching, and about to overlap Ward's left, and perceived
that unless prompt succor arrived Little Round Top would fall into
their hands. Once in their p
|