Little Round Top,
as the lesser of the two eminences on the left was called to
distinguish it from the higher peak called Round Top.

At 1 A.M. Meade arrived from Taneytown. When I saw him, soon after
daylight, he seemed utterly worn out and hollow-eyed. Anxiety and
want of sleep were evidently telling upon him. At dawn he commenced
forming his line by concentrating his forces on the right with a
view to descend into the plain and attack Lee's left, and the
Twelfth Corps were sent to Wadsworth's right to take part in the
movement. It seems to me that this would have been a very hazardous
enterprise, and I am not surprised that both Slocum and Warren
reported against it. The Fifth and Sixth Corps would necessarily
be very much fatigued after making a forced march. To put them in
at once, and direct them to drive a superior force of Lee's veterans
out of a town where every house would have been loop-holed, and
every street barricaded, would hardly have been judicious. If we
had succeeded in doing so, it would simply have reversed the battle
of Gettysburg, for the Confederate army would have fought behind
Seminary Ridge, and we would have been exposed in the plain below.
Nor do I think it would have been wise strategy to turn their left,
and drive them between us and Washington, for it would have enabled
them to threaten the capital, strengthen and shorten their line of
retreat, and endanger our communications at the same time. It is
an open secret that Meade at that time disapproved of the battle-
ground Hancock had selected.

Warren and Slocum having reported an attack against Lee's left as
unadvisable, Meade began to post troops on our left, with a view
to attack the enemy's right. This, in my opinion, would have been
much more sensible. Lee, however, solved the problem for him, and,
fortunately for us, forced him to remain on the defensive, by
ordering an assault against each extremity of the Union line.

There has been much discussion and a good deal of crimination and
recrimination among the rebel generals engaged as to which of them
lost the battle of Gettysburg.

I have already alluded to the fact that universal experience
demonstrates that columns converging on a central force almost
invariably fail in their object and are beaten in detail. Gettysburg
seems to me a striking exemplification of this; repeated columns
of assault launched by Lee against our lines came up in succession
and were defeate