e the rebel
general knew he was there. Buford having gone back toward Beverly
Ford, as stated, Gregg in his turn, fought the whole of Stuart's
force without the co-operation of either Buford or Duffie. It can
hardly be said that Duffie's column took any part in the action,
for he did not reach Brandy Station until late in the day. And
then, as the rebel infantry were approaching, Pleasonton ordered
a retreat.
For the future instruction of the reader it may be well to state
that every cavalry charge, unless supported by artillery or infantry,
is necessarily repulsed by a counter-charge; for when the force of
the attack is spent, the men who make it are always more or less
scattered, and therefore unable to contend against the impetus of
a fresh line of troops, who come against them at full speed and
strike in mass.
Stuart's headquarters were twice taken by Gregg's division, and a
company desk captured with very important despatches, but the enemy
had the most men, and most artillery near the point attacked, and
therefore always regained, by a counter-charge, the ground that
had been lost.
Stuart claims to have repulsed the last attack of Pleasonton against
Fleetwood Hill, and to have taken three guns, besides driving our
cavalry back across the river.
Pleasonton claims to have fully accomplished the object of his
reconnoissance, to have gained valuable information which enabled
Hooker to thwart Lee's plans; and to have so crippled the rebel
cavalry that its efficiency was very much impaired for the remainder
of the campaign; so that Lee was forced to take the indirect route
of the valley, instead of the direct one along the eastern base of
the Blue Ridge, behind his cavalry as a screen; his original
intention having been to enter Maryland at Poolesville and Monocacy.
GETTYSBURG.
CHAPTER I.
THE INVASION OF THE NORTH.
An invasion of the North being considered as both practicable and
necessary, it only remained to select the most available route.
There was no object in passing east of Hooker's army, and it would
have been wholly impracticable to do so, as the wide rivers to be
crossed were controlled by our gunboats.
To attempt to cross the Rappahannock to the west, and in the
immediate vicinity of Fredericksburg, would have been hazardous,
because when an army is crossing, the portion which is over is
liable to be crushed before it can be reinforced.
It would seem that Lee's first intenti
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