wton, being an engineer
officer by profession, had previously been sent by Sedgwick to
select a new line to cover the bridges, and the army was ordered
to fall back there. It did so without confusion, the roads having
been carefully picketed. Brooks took position on Newton's left,
after which Howe's division, whose right flank for a time had been
"in the air," withdrew also an hour later than the others, and
prolonged the line to the left. Howe complained that he was deserted
by Sedgwick, but the latter appears to have sent Wheaton's brigade
and other reinforcements to aid his retreat. The movement to the
rear was favored by the darkness and a thick fog, which settled
over the valleys, but did not extend to the high ground. As Benham
and Sedgwick, who were classmates at West Point, walked on the
slope of the hill where the men were lying--the crest above being
held by thirty-four guns on the opposite side of the river--Benham
cautioned Sedgwick not to recross under any circumstances without
his entire command, nor without Hooker's express sanction, advice
which Sedgwick was wise enough to follow.
The enemy did not assail the new position or attempt to interfere
with the crossing which soon after took place. When it was nearly
concluded, an order came from Hooker countermanding it, but it was
then too late to return.
Howe thinks Sedgwick should not have crossed, as the last attack
on the left, which was the vital point, had been repulsed. This
may be so, in the light of after-consideration, but it was very
doubtful at the time, and as Sedgwick had lost a fraction under
five thousand men in these operations, and was acting under the
false information that additional forces had come up from Richmond,
he felt that he had fully borne his share of the burden, and that
it was better to place his corps beyond the risk of capture, than
to run the chances of renewing the battle. It would, undoubtedly,
have been of immense advantage to the cause if he could have
continued to hold Taylor's Hill, which dominated the country round,
and was the key of the battle-field; for in that case Hooker might
have withdrawn from Lee's front and joined Sedgwick, which would
have been attaining the object for which our main army left Falmouth,
and made the turning movement. He would thus have gained a strategic
if not a tactical victory; his shortcomings would have been forgotten,
and he would have been regarded as one of the greates
|