t strategists
of the age. Hooker, however, had left so many things undone, that
it is by no means certain he would have carried out this policy,
although he expressed his intention to do so. Sedgwick's movement,
in my opinion, added another example to the evil effects of converging
columns against a central force.

There is little more to add in relation to Hooker's operations.
On the night of the 4th, he called a council of war, and after
stating the situation to them, absented himself, in order that they
might have full liberty to discuss the subject. Reynolds was
exhausted, and went to sleep, saying that his vote would be the
same as that of Meade. Meade voted to remain, because he thought
it would be impossible to cross in the presence of the enemy.
Sickles and Couch voted to retreat. Howard voted to remain, without
reference to the situation of the army, because in his opinion his
corps had behaved badly, and he wished to retrieve its reputation.
Slocum was not present. The final result was that Hooker determined
to cross, although the majority of votes were against it. The
votes of Meade and Howard, however, were qualified in such a way
as to give the impression they were in favor of a retreat.

Owing to a sudden rise in the river the bridges became too short,
and there was some doubt as to the practicability of passing over
them, but by taking down one, and piecing the others with it, the
difficulty was overcome and the army retired, without being followed
up, under cover of thirty-two guns posted on the heights on the
opposite bank. Meade's corps acted as rear guard.

Hooker left his killed and wounded behind, and had lost 14 guns
and 20,000 stand of arms.

It only remains to give a brief statement of the operations of
Stoneman's cavalry. These were of no avail as regard the battle
of Chancellorsville, for our army was defeated and in full retreat
before Lee's main line of communication with Richmond was struck,
and then all the damage was repaired in three or four days. There
seems to have been a lack of information as to where to strike;
for the principal depot of the rebel army was at Guiney's station
on the Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad. The supplies there
were but slightly guarded, and could easily have been captured.
Had this been done, Lee would have been seriously embarrassed,
notwithstanding his victory, and forced to fall back to obtain
subsistence.

Stoneman, upon setting out