he enemy's force still held their old
positions. Hooker, however, was determined to be prepared for all
contingencies, and therefore, on the same day, detached the Fifth
Corps to be in readiness to meet the enemy should they attempt to
force a passage anywhere between United States Ford and Banks'
Ford. Resolved to obtain certain information at all hazards, on
the 7th of June he ordered Pleasonton to make a forced reconnoissance
with all the available cavalry of the army, in the direction of
Culpeper, to ascertain whether the Confederate forces were really
concentrating there, with a view to an invasion of the North.

Should this prove to be the case, Hooker desired to cross the river,
to envelop and destroy Hill's corps, and then follow up the main
body as they proceeded northward, thus intercepting their communications
with Richmond. The authorities at Washington, however, did not
look with much equanimity upon the possibility of finding Lee's
army interposed between them and the Army of the Potomac, so they
refused to sanction the plan and it was abandoned.

Nevertheless, in my opinion it was about the best method that could
have been devised to check the invasion, provided that Hooker did
not lose his water-base; for Lee always showed himself very sensitive
whenever his communications with Richmond was threatened. If that
was severed no more _ammunition_ or military supplies would reach
him. The amount of cartridges on hand was necessarily limited.
It would soon be expended in constant skirmishes and engagements,
and then he would be helpless and at the mercy of his antagonist.
Consequently, the moment he heard that a portion of the Sixth Corps
had crossed and confronted Hill, he directed Ewell and Longstreet
to halt at Locust Grove, near Chancellorsville, and be in readiness
to return to Fredericksburg to assist Hill in case there was any
danger of his being overpowered. Finding Sedgwick's advance was
a mere reconnoissance, the two rebel corps resumed their march to
Culpeper.

Hooker deemed it essential to success, that all troops connected
with the theatre of invasion should be placed under his command,
so that they could act in unison. In his opinion most of their
strength was wasted in discordant expeditions, which were useless
as regards the general result. He referred more particularly to
General Dix's command at Old Point Comfort, General Heintzelman's
command in Washington, and General Schenck's