not fired
a shot, and all of whom were eager to go in. The whole of the
First Corps and three-fourths of the Fifth Corps had not been
engaged. These, with 5,000 of the Eleventh Corps, who desired to
retrieve the disaster of the previous day and were ready to advance,
made a new army, which had it been used against Stuart's tired men
would necessarily have driven them off the field; for there were
but 26,000 of them when the fight commenced. To make the matter
worse, a large part of this force--the First and Fifth Corps--stood
with arms in their hands, as spectators, almost directly on the
left flank of the enemy; so that their mere advance would have
swept everything before it. Hancock, too, says that his men were
fresh enough to go forward again.

Couch succeeded to the command after Hooker was wounded, and made
dispositions for the final stand around the Chancellorsville House,
where the battle lasted some time longer, and where a battery of
the Fifth Corps was sacrificed to cover the retreat of the troops.
He did not, however, take the responsibility of renewing the contest
with fresh troops, perhaps deterred by the fact that Anderson's
and McLaws' divisions had now effected a junction with Stuart's
corps; so that the chances were somewhat less favorable than they
would have been had Sickles and French had been reinforced before
the junction took place. He says, at the close of the action, that
fifty guns posted to the right and front of the Chancellorsville
House would have swept the enemy away.

I think Hooker was beset with the idea of keeping back a large
portion of his force to be used in case of emergency. It appears
from a statement made by General Alexander S. Webb, who had made
a daring personal reconnoissance of the enemy's movement, that he
was present when Meade--acting on his (Webb's) representations,
and speaking for himself and Reynolds--asked Hooker's permission
to let the First and Fifth Corps take part in the battle. It is
fair, however, to state that Hooker, having been injured and in
great pain, was hardly accountable for his want of decision at this
time. Indeed, General Tremaine, who was a colonel on Sickles'
staff, says that Hooker did intend to use his reserve force as soon
as the enemy were utterly exhausted. President Lincoln seems to
have had a presentiment of what would occur, for his parting words
to Hooker and Couch were, to use all the troops and not keep any
back.

I ha