, and that Jackson was getting farther and father away,
rode leisurely back, at Sickles' suggestion, to Hazel Grove, which
was an open space of considerable elevation to the right of the
Twelfth Corps. As he drew near, the roar of battle burst upon his
ears from the right of the line and a scene of horror and confusion
presented itself, presaging the rout of the entire army if some
immediate measures were not taken to stem the tide of disaster.

CHAPTER IV.
THE ROUT OF THE ELEVENTH CORPS.

Notwithstanding Hooker's order of 9.30 A.M. calling Howard's
attention to the weakness of his right flank, and the probability
that Jackson was marching to attack it, no precautions were taken
against the impending danger. The simple establishing of a front
of two regiments toward the west when half his command would hardly
have been sufficient, unless protected by works of some kind, was
perfectly idle as a barrier against the torrent about to overwhelm
the Eleventh Corps. So far as I can ascertain, only two companies
were thrown out on picket, and they were unsupported by grand
guards, so that they did not detain the enemy a moment, and the
rebels and our pickets all came in together. Great stress has been
laid upon the fact that Howard did have a reserve force--Barlow's
brigade of 2,500 men--facing west, which Hooker withdrew to reinforce
Sickles; but is not shown that Howard made any remonstrance or
attached any great importance to its removal. Even if it had
remained, as there were not strong intrenchments in front of it,
it is not probable that it would have been able to resist Jackson's
entire corps for any length of time. There was no reason other
than Howard's utter want of appreciation of the gravity of the
situation to prevent him from forming a strong line of defence to
protect his right flank. If made with felled timber in front and
redoubts on the flanks, Jackson could not have overleaped it, or
even attacked it without heavy loss. If he stopped to do so,
Sickles' corps and Williams' division of the Twelfth Corps, with
the reserve forces under Berry and French, would soon have confronted
him. If he had attempted to keep on farther down to attack the
United States Ford, he would have met the First Corps there, and
would have permanently severed all connection between himself and
Lee, besides endangering his line of retreat. The apathy and
indifference Howard manifested in relation to Jackson's approach
c