right of our line all gone, with a yawning gap
where Sickles' corps and Williams' division had previously been
posted, with Lee thundering against the centre and left, and Jackson
taking all our defences in reverse, his first line being close on
Chancellorsville itself, it seemed as if the total rout of the army
was inevitable.
Just before this attack, Hooker had decided to interpose more force
between the wings of the rebel army, in order to permanently dissever
Jackson from the main body. If Sickles had been allowed to attack
the left flank of the enemy opposite the Furnace, as he requested
permission to do earlier in the afternoon, this co-operative movement
could hardly have failed to produce great results; afterward it
was too late to attempt it. As already stated, Williams' division
struck Anderson in front on Birney's left, and Geary attacked McLaws
across the Plank Road to the right of Hancock. Geary found the
enemy strongly posted, and as he made no progress, returned to his
works. When the rout of the Eleventh Corps took place, Williams
also hastened back, but was fired upon by Jackson's troops, who
now occupied the intrenchments he had left. Sickles thinks if this
had not occurred several regiments of the enemy would have been
cut off from the main body.
CHAPTER V.
JACKSON'S ADVANCE IS CHECKED.
The constantly increasing uproar, and the wild rush of fugitives
past the Chancellorsville House, told Hooker what had occurred,
and roused him to convulsive life. His staff charged on the flying
crowd, but failed to stop them, and it became necessary to form a
line of fresh troops speedily, as Jackson was sweeping everything
before him. It was not easy to find an adequate force for this
emergency. The whole line was now actively engaged, Slocum being
attacked on the south, and Couch and Meade on the east. Fortunately,
Berry's division was held in reserve, and was available. They were
true and tried men, and went forward at once to the rescue. Berry
was directed to form across the Plank Road, drive the rebels back,
and retake the lost intrenchments; an order easy to give, but very
difficult to execute. The most he could do, under the circumstances,
was to form his line in the valley opposite Fairview, and hold his
position there, the enemy already having possession of the higher
ground beyond.
Before Berry went out, Warren had stopped several of the Eleventh
Corps batteries, and had formed th
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