ness; trusting that old associations and the honor of the men
would induce them to rejoin their colors when the leaves of absence
had expired. In this way he almost stopped the desertion which
had been so prevalent under Burnside. Only one portion of the army
was dissatisfied; the position recently occupied by General Franz
Sigel, the favorite commander of the Eleventh Corps, had been given
to General O. O. Howard. The numerous Germans in that corps were
discontented at the change. They cared little for Howard's reputation
as the Havelock of the army; an appellation he had gained from his
zeal as a Congregationalist. They felt, when their countryman
Sigel was deprived of his command, that it was a blow to their
nationality, and therefore lost some of the enthusiasm which always
accompanies the personal influence of a popular leader.

The rainy season was nearly over, the time had come for action,
and it was essential to strike a decisive blow before the term of
service of the nine months' and two years' men had drawn to a close.
Hooker's plan of campaign was simple, efficacious, and should have
been successful. The rebels occupied a long line and could not be
strong everywhere. He resolved to make a pretence of crossing with
three corps, under Major-General Sedgwick, below Fredericksburg,
while the remaining four corps under Major-General Slocum made a
detour and crossed twenty-seven miles above at Kelly's Ford. The
latter were then to march down the river against the left flank of
the rebel army and re-open Banks' Ford; thus re-uniting the two
wings of the army and giving a secure line of retreat in case of
disaster. When this was accomplished it was proposed to give battle
in the open country near the ford, the position there being a
commanding one and taking the whole line of rebel works on the
heights of Fredericksburg in reverse. Owing to his great preponderance
of force, Hooker had little reason to doubt that the result would
be favorable to our arms. To carry out this plan and make it a
complete surprise to the enemy it became necessary to leave Gibbon's
division of Couch's corps behind, for as his encampment at Falmouth
was in full view of the Confederate forces on the opposite side,
to withdraw it would have been to notify them that some unusual
movement was going on. So far the idea was simply to crush the
opposing army, but Hooker's plan went farther and involved the
capture of Lee's entire force