J. C. Robinson, which
were held in reserve on the north side of the river; but as our
men were pretty well sheltered, there were but few casualties.

It soon became evident that the enemy would not attack the bridge
heads, they being well guarded by artillery on the north bank, so
Sickles' corps was detached on the 30th and ordered to Chancellorsville.

Sedgwick used the remainder of his men to great advantage by marching
them back and forth among the hills in such a way as to lead Lee
to suppose that a very large force confronted him. As, however,
Sedgwick did not advance, and more accurate reports were furnished
by Stuart in relation to what had taken place up the river, Lee
saw, on the night of the 30th, that the movement in front of
Fredericksburg was a feint, and his real antagonist was at
Chancellorsville. He had previously ordered Jackson's corps up
from Moss Creek and now advanced with the main body of his army to
meet Hooker, leaving Early's division of Jackson's corps and
Barksdale's brigade of McLaws' division of Longstreet's corps to
hold the heights of Fredericksburg against Sedgwick. Jackson, who
was always prompt, started at midnight, and at 8 A.M. the next day
stood by the side of Anderson at Tabernacle Church. McLaws' division
had already arrived, having preceded him by a few hours.

The error in the movement thus far made is plain. It is a maxim
in war that a single hour's delay, when an enemy is strengthening
his position or when reinforcements are coming up, will frequently
cost the lives of a thousand men. In the present instance it was
simply suicidal for Hooker to delay action until Anderson had
fortified his lines and Lee had come forward with the main body to
join him. Hooker should have pressed on immediately to seize the
objective. Banks' Ford was almost within his grasp, and only a
portion of Anderson's division barred the way. The possession of
that ford would have brought Sedgwick twelve miles nearer to him,
and would have forced Lee to fight at a great disadvantage both as
to position and numbers. Hooker knew from a captured despatch
which Pleasonton placed in his hands, that Lee was still in
Fredericksburg on the 30th, uncertain how to act; for he did not
know the strength of Sedgwick's column, and feared that the main
attack might come from that direction. The four corps at
Chancellorsville amounted to about forty-six thousand men; and
18,000 more were close at hand under