to vote ... every
such person shall be deemed guilty of a crime ... and on
conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine not exceeding
$500, or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding three
years, or by both, in the discretion of the court, and shall
pay the costs of prosecution.

The only alleged ground of illegality of the defendant's vote is
that she is a woman. If the same act had been done by her brother
under the same circumstances, the act would have been not only
innocent, but honorable and laudable; but having been done by a
woman it is said to be a crime. The crime, therefore, consists
not in the act done, but in the simple fact that the person doing
it was a woman and not a man. I believe this is the first
instance in which a woman has been arraigned in a criminal court
merely on account of her sex. If the advocates of female suffrage
had been allowed to choose the point of attack to be made upon
their position, they could not have chosen it more favorably for
themselves; and I am disposed to thank those who have been
instrumental in this proceeding, for presenting it in the form
of a criminal prosecution. Women have the same interest that men
have in the establishment and maintenance of good government;
they are to the same extent as men bound to obey the laws; they
suffer to the same extent by bad laws, and profit to the same
extent by good laws; and upon principles of equal justice, as it
would seem, should be allowed equally with men, to express their
preference in the choice of law-makers and rulers. But however
that may be, no greater absurdity, to use no harsher term, could
be presented, than that of rewarding men and punishing women, for
the same act, without giving to women any voice in the question
which should be rewarded, and which punished.

I am aware, however, that we are here to be governed by the
Constitution and laws as they are, and that if the defendant has
been guilty of violating the law, she must submit to the penalty,
however unjust or absurd the law may be. But courts are not
required to so interpret laws or constitutions as to produce
either absurdity or injustice, so long as they are open to a more
reasonable interpretation. This must be my excuse for what I
design to say