ividuum_, implying that if, on the
other part, an individual action be necessary (as for example the action
of hearing the word), then it is in itself good, _etiam quo ad
individuum_.

But, I reply, what means he by these words, _in se_? Means he the
individual nature of the action? Nay, then the sense shall be no other
than this, _quo ad individuum, etiam quo ad individuum_. And, besides, the
Doctor cannot define to us any other nature in an individual thing than
the nature of the species or kind.

Is it not holden _individuum non posse definiri, nisi definitione
specici_?(1176) Sure a perfect definition, expressing the nature of the
thing defined, cannot be given to any individual thing other than the
definition of the species, needs, therefore, must the Doctor, by _in se_,
understand the specifical nature, and, indeed, when divines speak of
things indifferent, _in se_, _per se_, or _sua natura_, they mean only
things indifferent _quo ad speciem_. Yet thus also the Doctor hath said
nonsense, for so we should take his words, _quamvis quoad speciem sit
media et libera, etiam quo ad individuum_.

_Sect._ 3. But to let his manner of speaking pass, we will consider what
he would or could have said. There is no difference which can here be
imagined except this: That the individual action of hearing the word (when
one heareth aright) is good and remunerable in a double respect, namely,
because it is both good in itself, or _quo ad speciem_, and likewise
_respectu adjecti modi_, whereas a woman's action of marrying (when she
marrieth in the Lord) is only good and remunerable in the last respect,
namely, _respectu modi_, for, _in se_, or, _quo ad speciem_, it hath no
remunerable goodness in it.

_Ans._ What do we hear of any difference betwixt these actions _quo ad
speciem_? That which we crave is, that a difference may be showed betwixt
the remunerable goodness of the one and of the other, both being
considered _quo ad individuum_.

That whereby the Doctor either was deceived, or would deceive, appeareth
to be this: That he taketh everything which agreeth to an individual thing
to agree to it _quo ad individuum_, as if to speak of Peter _quatenus est
homo_, and to speak of him _quatenus est individuum signatum_, or _res
singularis sub specie hominis_, were all one thing. Even so, to say of my
individual action of hearing the word, that it is necessary because of the
commandment of God (and in that respect remunerable), i