erable, and
so not indifferent. Yea, those actions which he calleth necessary, being
considered _quo ad individuum_, are no otherwise laudable and remunerable
than those which he calleth indifferent, being considered in like manner
_quo ad individuum_, as hath been showed.

_Sect._ 5. And besides all this, we have somewhat more to say of the
Doctor's speculation about the nature of things indifferent.

For, 1. The Doctor maketh that which is indifferent to be opponed to that
which is necessary, and yet he maketh both these to be morally good. Now
albeit in natural things one good is opponed to another good, as that
which is hot to that which is cold, yet _bonum bona non contrariatur in
moralibus_.(1181) The reason of the difference is, because _bonitas
physica_, or _relativa est congruentia naturae quaedem_, saith
Scalliger;(1182) and because two natures may be contrary one to another,
therefore the good which is congruous to the one may be contrary to the
good which is congruous to the other; but _bonum virtutis_, saith
Aquinas(1183) _non accipitur nisi per convenientiam ad aliquid unum,
scilicet rationem_; so that it is impossible for one moral good to be
opponed to another.

2. Since divines take a thing indifferent to be _medium inter bonum et
malum morale_; and since (as the very notation of the word showeth) it is
such a means as cometh not nearer to the one extreme than to the other,
but is alike distant from both, how comes it that the Doctor so far
departeth both from the tenet of divines and from the notation of the
word, as to call some such actions indifferent as have a moral remunerable
goodness, and yet not evil in them? or where learned he such a dialect as
giveth to some good things the name of the things indifferent?

3. Why doth he also waver from himself; for he citeth(1184) out of the
Helvetic Confessor Jerome's definition of a thing indifferent, and
approveth it. _Indifferens_, saith he, _illud est quod nec bonum nec malum
est, ut sive feceris sive non feceris, nec justitiam habeas nec
injustitiam._ Behold the goodness which is excluded from the nature of a
thing indifferent is not only necessity but righteousness also, yet hath
the Doctor excluded only the good of necessity from things indifferent,
making the other good of righteousness to stand with them; for things
which are done in faith, and done for the right end (such as he
acknowledgeth these things to be which he calleth indifferent), ha