s not to speak of
it _quo ad individuum_, but as the specifical nature of that action of
hearing the word (which God hath commanded) is found in it; for if we
speak of this individual action, _quo ad individuum_, we cannot consider
it otherwise than _respectu adjecti modi_, because, in moral actions,
_modus adjectus_ is _principium individuationis_, and nothing else doth
individualise a moral action.

_Sect._ 4. Thus shall my position stand good, namely, that those
individual actions which the Doctor calleth necessary, because their
species is commanded of God, and those individual actions which he calleth
indifferent, because their _species_ is not commanded, both being
considered _quo ad individuum_, the former hath no other remunerable good
in them than the latter, and the whole remunerable good which is in either
of them standeth only _in objecto modo_; which being so, it is all one
when we speak of any individual moral action _quo ad individuum_, whether
we say that it is good, or that it is remunerable and laudable, both are
one. For, as is well said by Aquinas,(1177) _Necessarium est omnem actum
hominis, ut bonum vel malum, culpabilis vel laudabilis rationem habere_.
And again: _Nihil enim est aliud laudari vel culpari, quam imputari alicui
malitiam vel bonitatem sui actus_; wherefore that distinction of a twofold
goodness, _causans_ and _concomitans_, which the Doctor hath given us,
hath no use in this question, because every action is laudable and
remunerable which is morally good, whether it be necessary or not. Now
moral goodness, saith Scalliger,(1178) _est perfectio actus cum recta
ratione_. Human moral actions are called good or evil, _in ordine ad
rationem, quae est proprium principium humanorum actuum_, saith
Aquinas,(1179) thereupon inferring that _illis mores dicuntur boni, qui
rationi congruunt; mali autem, qui a ratione discordant_. Dr Forbesse doth
therefore pervert the question whilst he saith,(1180) _in hac cum
fratribus quaestione, hoc bonum est quod necessarium_. Nay, those actions
we call morally good which are agreeable to right reason, whether they be
necessary or not. Since, then, those actions are laudable and remunerable
which are morally good, and those are morally good which are agreeable to
right reason, it followeth, that forasmuch as those actions which the
Doctor calleth indifferent, are agreeable to right reason, they are,
therefore, not only morally good, but also laudable and remun