acere Deo_.

_Sect._ 4. These considerations being permitted, for resolution of the
question in hand, we say, 1. As touching those actions which proceed from
bare imagination, whether they be evil and inordinate _quo ad speciem_,
forsomuch as the imagination from which they have their original doth not
in those actions subject itself to the conduct and moderation of reason,
but is like Gehazi, running away without his master's leave, let the
learned give their judgment. Howsoever, it cannot be denied, that such
actions may be and are of a civil _quo ad individuum_,(1203) or in respect
of the circumstances, which show forth in them reprovable temerity,
incogitancy, levity, and indecency. But such actions belong not to our
purpose. 2. As for those actions which proceed from the deliberation of
reason, howbeit many of them be indifferent, _quo ad speciem_, yet none of
them are, nor can be indifferent, _quo ad individuum_. The reason of this
difference and distinction is, because every action hath its species or
kind,(1204) from the object, and a human moral action hath its species or
kind from the object referred to the original of human actions, which is
reason. Whereupon it cometh, that if the object of the action include
something that agreeth to the order of reason, it shall be a good action,
according to its kind; for example, to give alms to an indigent man. But
if it include something that is repugnant to the order of reason, it shall
be an evil action according to its kind; as to steal or take away another
man's goods. Now sometimes it happeneth that the object of an action doth
not include something that belongeth to the order of reason; as to lift a
straw from the ground, to go to the field, &c., such actions are
indifferent, according to their kind. But we must pronounce far otherwise
of them when we speak of them _quo ad individuum_, because as they are
individuated by their circumstances, so in their individual being, they
have their goodness or badness from the same circumstances, as hath been
showed. So that no such action as is deliberated upon can be indifferent,
_quo ad individuum_; because _oportet_ (saith Thomas(1205)) _quod quilibet
individualis actus habeat aliquam circumstantiam, per quam trahetur ad
bonum vel malum, ad minus ex parte intentionis finis_. Friar Ambrosius
Catarinus, following the doctrine of Thomas, maintained in the Council of
Trent,(1206) that to do good was a work, the concurrences of