he supposeth that there are some
things which we do neither laudably nor culpably, and for which we shall
neither be rewarded (it is his own phrase which I use) nor yet punished by
God. I thought we had learned from Scripture that we must all appear
before the judgment-seat of Christ, to give an account of every word which
we speak, and of every deed which we do in the flesh, and accordingly to
receive either a reward or a punishment. What! Could the Doctor say that
these good actions which he calleth indifferent, and of which he saith
that they are done in faith, and for the right end, are not laudable nor
remunerable? Nay, but he saith(1174) that the general goodness which
accompanieth the action is remunerable, because it is necessary, but the
action itself is not necessary, because that general goodness may be had
as well in the omission of it, or in the doing of the contrary, as in the
doing of it, whereupon he would have it to follow that the action itself
is not remunerable.

_Ans._ 1. The Doctor had done well to have remembered that he is speaking
only of individual actions, and that _actus individuatur a circumstantus
et adjecto modo_, so that whilst all that he saith turneth to this, that
one action considered in itself, without the circumstances and concomitant
goodness, is not remunerable, he maketh not out his point; for he saith no
more in effect, but that _actus quo ad speciem_ is not remunerable, which
none of us denieth.

2. An individual good action of that kind which the Doctor calleth
necessary, is no otherwise remunerable and laudable than an individual
good action of that kind which he calleth indifferent, for example, when I
go to hear God's word upon the Lord's day, let this action of mine be
considered _quo ad individuum_, is it any otherwise remunerable than in
respect of the goodness which accompanieth it? Whence it is that the
hearing of hypocrites, not being accompanied with such goodness, is not
remunerable, yet the hearing of the word is an action necessary, because
commanded? Now may we know wherein standeth the difference betwixt the
remunerable good of this action of hearing, and remunerable good of one of
those actions which the Doctor calleth indifferent, for example, a woman's
action of marrying.

I perceive what the Doctor would answer, for he saith,(1175) if a woman
marry in the Lord, this action is good _respectu adjecti modi, quamvis in
se sit media et libera, etiam quo ad ind