en lose sight of all the most received
maxims, either of philosophy or common life. I am not, however, without
hopes, that the present system of philosophy will acquire new force as
it advances; and that our reasonings concerning morals will corroborate
whatever has been said concerning the UNDERSTANDING and the PASSIONS.
Morality is a subject that interests us above all others: We fancy the
peace of society to be at stake in every decision concerning it; and
it is evident, that this concern must make our speculations appear
more real and solid, than where the subject is, in a great measure,
indifferent to us. What affects us, we conclude can never be a chimera;
and as our passion is engaged on the one side or the other, we naturally
think that the question lies within human comprehension; which, in other
cases of this nature, we are apt to entertain some doubt of. Without
this advantage I never should have ventured upon a third volume of such
abstruse philosophy, in an age, wherein the greatest part of men seem
agreed to convert reading into an amusement, and to reject every thing
that requires any considerable degree of attention to be comprehended.
It has been observed, that nothing is ever present to the mind but
its perceptions; and that all the actions of seeing, hearing, judging,
loving, hating, and thinking, fall under this denomination. The mind can
never exert itself in any action, which we may not comprehend under the
term of perception; and consequently that term is no less applicable to
those judgments, by which we distinguish moral good and evil, than
to every other operation of the mind. To approve of one character, to
condemn another, are only so many different perceptions.
Now as perceptions resolve themselves into two kinds, viz. impressions
and ideas, this distinction gives rise to a question, with which we
shall open up our present enquiry concerning morals. WHETHER IT IS
BY MEANS OF OUR IDEAS OR IMPRESSIONS WE DISTINGUISH BETWIXT VICE AND
VIRTUE, AND PRONOUNCE AN ACTION BLAMEABLE OR PRAISEWORTHY? This will
immediately cut off all loose discourses and declamations, and reduce us
to something precise and exact on the present subject.
Those who affirm that virtue is nothing but a conformity to reason; that
there are eternal fitnesses and unfitnesses of things, which are the
same to every rational being that considers them; that the immutable
measures of right and wrong impose an obligation, not onl
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