ad no tendency to produce any false
conclusion.

For the same reason, a thief, who steals In by a ladder at a
window, and takes all imaginable care to cause no
disturbance, is in no respect criminal. For either he will
not be perceived, or if he be, it is impossible he can
produce any error, nor will any one, from these
circumstances, take him to be other than what he really is.

It is well known, that those who are squint-sighted, do very
readily cause mistakes in others, and that we Imagine they
salute or are talking to one person, while they address
themselves to anther. Are they therefore, upon that account,
immoral?

Besides, we may easily observe, that in all those arguments
there is an evident reasoning in a circle. A person who
takes possession of another's goods, and uses them as his
own, in a manner declares them to be his own; and this
falshood is the source of the immorality of injustice. But
is property, or right, or obligation, intelligible, without
an antecedent morality?

A man that is ungrateful to his benefactor, in a manner
affirms, that he never received any favours from him. But in
what manner? Is it because it is his duty to be grateful?
But this supposes, that there is some antecedent rule of
duty and morals. Is it because human nature is generally
grateful, and makes us conclude, that a man who does any
harm never received any favour from the person he harmed?
But human nature is not so generally grateful, as to justify
such a conclusion. Or if it were, is an exception to a
general rule in every case criminal, for no other reason
than because it is an exception?

But what may suffice entirely to destroy this whimsical
system is, that it leaves us under the same difficulty to
give a reason why truth is virtuous and falshood vicious, as
to account for the merit or turpitude of any other action. I
shall allow, if you please, that all immorality is derived
from this supposed falshood in action, provided you can give
me any plausible reason, why such a falshood is immoral. If
you consider rightly of the matter, you will find yourself
in the same difficulty as at the beginning.

This last argument is very conclusive; because, if there be
not an evident merit or turpitude annexed to this spec