judgment, and lays the foundation of that reasoning, which we build upon
it, when we trace the relation of cause and effect.
SECT. VI. OF THE INFERENCE FROM THE IMPRESSION TO THE IDEA.
It is easy to observe, that in tracing this relation, the inference we
draw from cause to effect, is not derived merely from a survey of these
particular objects, and from such a penetration into their essences
as may discover the dependance of the one upon the other. There is no
object, which implies the existence of any other if we consider these
objects in themselves, and never look beyond the ideas which we form of
them. Such an inference would amount to knowledge, and would imply
the absolute contradiction and impossibility of conceiving any thing
different. But as all distinct ideas are separable, it is evident
there can be no impossibility of that kind. When we pass from a present
impression to the idea of any object, we might possibly have separated
the idea from the impression, and have substituted any other idea in its
room.
It is therefore by EXPERIENCE only, that we can infer the existence of
one object from that of another. The nature of experience is this. We
remember to have had frequent instances of the existence of one species
of objects; and also remember, that the individuals of another species
of objects have always attended them, and have existed in a regular
order of contiguity and succession with regard to them. Thus we
remember, to have seen that species of object we call flame, and to have
felt that species of sensation we call heat. We likewise call to mind
their constant conjunction in all past instances. Without any farther
ceremony, we call the one cause and the other effect, and infer the
existence of the one from that of the other. In all those instances,
from which we learn the conjunction of particular causes and effects,
both the causes and effects have been perceived by the senses, and are
remembered But in all cases, wherein we reason concerning them, there
is only one perceived or remembered, and the other is supplyed in
conformity to our past experience.
Thus in advancing we have insensibly discovered a new relation betwixt
cause and effect, when we least expected it, and were entirely employed
upon another subject. This relation is their CONSTANT CONJUNCTION.
Contiguity and succession are not sufficient to make us pronounce any
two objects to be cause and effect, unless we perceive, th
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