sult of such a throw. Let us, therefore, consider
gradually and carefully what must be the influence of these
circumstances on the thought and imagination.
First, We have already observed, that the mind is determined by custom
to pass from any cause to its effect, and that upon the appearance
of the one, it is almost impossible for it not to form an idea of the
other. Their constant conjunction in past instances has produced such
a habit in the mind, that it always conjoins them in its thought, and
infers the existence of the one from that of its usual attendant. When
it considers the dye as no longer supported by the box, it can not
without violence regard it as suspended in the air; but naturally places
it on the table, and views it as turning up one of its sides. This
is the effect of the intermingled causes, which are requisite to our
forming any calculation concerning chances.
Secondly, It is supposed, that though the dye be necessarily determined
to fall, and turn up one of its sides, yet there is nothing to fix the
particular side, but that this is determined entirely by chance. The
very nature and essence of chance is a negation of causes, and the
leaving the mind in a perfect indifference among those events, which
are supposed contingent. When therefore the thought is determined by the
causes to consider the dye as falling and turning up one of its sides,
the chances present all these sides as equal, and make us consider every
one of them, one after another, as alike probable and possible. The
imagination passes from the cause, viz. the throwing of the dye, to the
effect, viz. the turning up one of the six sides; and feels a kind of
impossibility both of stopping short in the way, and of forming any
other idea. But as all these six sides are incompatible, and the dye
cannot turn up above one at once, this principle directs us not to
consider all of them at once as lying uppermost; which we look upon
as impossible: Neither does it direct us with its entire force to any
particular side; for in that case this side would be considered as
certain and inevitable; but it directs us to the whole six sides after
such a manner as to divide its force equally among them. We conclude in
general, that some one of them must result from the throw: We run all
of them over in our minds: The determination of the thought is common to
all; but no more of its force falls to the share of any one, than what
is suitable to its propo
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