. Now nothing is more evident, than that the human mind
cannot form such an idea of two objects, as to conceive any connexion
betwixt them, or comprehend distinctly that power or efficacy, by which
they are united. Such a connexion would amount to a demonstration, and
would imply the absolute impossibility for the one object not to follow,
or to be conceived not to follow upon the other: Which kind of connexion
has already been rejected in all cases. If any one is of a contrary
opinion, and thinks he has attained a notion of power in any particular
object, I desire he may point out to me that object. But till I meet
with such-a-one, which I despair of, I cannot forbear concluding, that
since we can never distinctly conceive how any particular power can
possibly reside in any particular object, we deceive ourselves in
imagining we can form any such general idea.

Thus upon the whole we may infer, that when we talk of any being,
whether of a superior or inferior nature, as endowed with a power
or force, proportioned to any effect; when we speak of a necessary
connexion betwixt objects, and suppose, that this connexion depends upon
an efficacy or energy, with which any of these objects are endowed; in
all these expressions, so applied, we have really no distinct meaning,
and make use only of common words, without any clear and determinate
ideas. But as it is more probable, that these expressions do here lose
their true meaning by being wrong applied, than that they never have
any meaning; it will be proper to bestow another consideration on this
subject, to see if possibly we can discover the nature and origin of
those ideas, we annex to them.

Suppose two objects to be presented to us, of which the one is the
cause and the other the effect; it is plain, that from the simple
consideration of one, or both these objects we never shall perceive the
tie by which they are united, or be able certainly to pronounce, that
there is a connexion betwixt them. It is not, therefore, from any one
instance, that we arrive at the idea of cause and effect, of a necessary
connexion of power, of force, of energy, and of efficacy. Did we never
see any but particular conjunctions of objects, entirely different from
each other, we should never be able to form any such ideas.

But again; suppose we observe several instances, in which the same
objects are always conjoined together, we immediately conceive a
connexion betwixt them, and begin to