n conversation, after
talking of a person, that is any way celebrated, that one, who has
no acquaintance with him, will say, I have never seen such-a-one, but
almost fancy I have; so often have I heard talk of him. All these are
parallel instances.
If we consider this argument from EDUCATION in a proper light, it will
appear very convincing; and the more so, that it is founded on one
of the most common phaenomena, that is any where to be met with. I am
persuaded, that upon examination we shall find more than one half of
those opinions, that prevail among mankind, to be owing to education,
and that the principles, which are thus implicitely embraced,
overballance those, which are owing either to abstract reasoning or
experience. As liars, by the frequent repetition of their lies, come at
last to remember them; so the judgment, or rather the imagination, by
the like means, may have ideas so strongly imprinted on it, and conceive
them in so full a light, that they may operate upon the mind in the same
manner with those, which the senses, memory or reason present to us. But
as education is an artificial and not a natural cause, and as its maxims
are frequently contrary to reason, and even to themselves in different
times and places, it is never upon that account recognized by
philosophers; though in reality it be built almost on the same
foundation of custom and repetition as our reasonings from causes and
effects.
[Footnote 7. In general we may observe, that as our assent
to all probable reasonings is founded on the vivacity of
ideas, It resembles many of those whimsies and prejudices,
which are rejected under the opprobrious character of being
the offspring of the imagination. By this expression it
appears that the word, imagination, is commonly usd in two
different senses; and tho nothing be more contrary to true
philosophy, than this inaccuracy, yet in the following
reasonings I have often been obligd to fall into it. When I
oppose the Imagination to the memory, I mean the faculty, by
which we form our fainter ideas. When I oppose it to reason,
I mean the same faculty, excluding only our demonstrative
and probable reasonings. When I oppose it to neither, it is
indifferent whether it be taken in the larger or more
limited sense, or at least the context will sufficiently
explain the meaning.]
SECT. X. OF THE INFLUENCE OF BELI
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