f him; they seem to set the man
himself before my very eyes. Speusippus was here; so was
Xenocrates; so was his pupil, Polemo, and that very seat
which we may view was his.

"Then again, when I looked at our Senate-house (I mean the
old building of Hostilius, not this new one; when it was
enlarged, it diminished in my estimation), I used to think
of Scipio, Cato, Laelius and in particular of my own
grandfather.

"Such is the power of places to evoke associations; so it is
with good reason that they are used as a basis for memory
training."}]

No one can doubt but causation has the same influence as the other two
relations; of resemblance and contiguity. Superstitious people are fond
of the relicks of saints and holy men, for the same reason that they
seek after types and images, in order to enliven their devotion, and
give them a more intimate and strong conception of those exemplary
lives, which they desire to imitate. Now it is evident, one of the best
relicks a devotee coued procure, would be the handywork of a saint; and
if his cloaths and furniture are ever to be considered in this light, it
is because they were once at his disposal, and were moved and affected
by him; in which respect they are to be considered as imperfect effects,
and as connected with him by a shorter chain of consequences than any
of those, from which we learn the reality of his existence. This
phaenomenon clearly proves, that a present impression with a relation
of causation may, inliven any idea, and consequently produce belief or
assent, according to the precedent definition of it.

But why need we seek for other arguments to prove, that a present
impression with a relation or transition of the fancy may inliven any
idea, when this very instance of our reasonings from cause and effect
will alone suffice to that purpose? It is certain we must have an idea
of every matter of fact, which we believe. It is certain, that this idea
arises only from a relation to a present impression. It is certain, that
the belief super-adds nothing to the idea, but only changes our manner
of conceiving it, and renders it more strong and lively. The present
conclusion concerning the influence of relation is the immediate
consequence of all these steps; and every step appears to me sure end
infallible. There enters nothing into this operation of the mind but a
present impression, a lively idea, and a rel