ch we were thinking, but also conceive the action of the mind in
the meditation, that certain JE-NE-SCAI-QUOI, of which it is impossible
to give any definition or description, but which every one sufficiently
understands. When the memory offers an idea of this, and represents it
as past, it is easily conceived how that idea may have more vigour and
firmness, than when we think of a past thought, of which we have no
remembrance.

After this any one will understand how we may form the idea of an
impression and of an idea, and how we way believe the existence of an
impression and of an idea.

SECT. IX. OF THE EFFECTS OF OTHER RELATIONS AND OTHER HABITS.

However convincing the foregoing arguments may appear, we must not rest
contented with them, but must turn the subject on every side, in order
to find some new points of view, from which we may illustrate and
confirm such extraordinary, and such fundamental principles. A
scrupulous hesitation to receive any new hypothesis is so laudable a
disposition in philosophers, and so necessary to the examination of
truth, that it deserves to be complyed with, and requires that every
argument be produced, which may tend to their satisfaction, and every
objection removed, which may stop them in their reasoning.

I have often observed, that, beside cause and effect, the two relations
of resemblance and contiguity, are to be considered as associating
principles of thought, and as capable of conveying the imagination from
one idea to another. I have also observed, that when of two objects
connected to-ether by any of these relations, one is immediately
present to the memory or senses, not only the mind is conveyed to
its co-relative by means of the associating principle; but likewise
conceives it with an additional force and vigour, by the united
operation of that principle, and of the present impression. All this
I have observed, in order to confirm by analogy, my explication of
our judgments concerning cause and effect. But this very argument may,
perhaps, be turned against me, and instead of a confirmation of my
hypothesis, may become an objection to it. For it may be said, that if
all the parts of that hypothesis be true, viz. that these three species
of relation are derived from the same principles; that their effects
in informing and enlivening our ideas are the same; and that belief is
nothing but a more forcible and vivid conception of an idea; it should
follow, that