that action of the mind may not only be derived from the
relation of cause and effect, but also from those of contiguity and
resemblance. But as we find by experience, that belief arises only from
causation, and that we can draw no inference from one object to another,
except they be connected by this relation, we may conclude, that there
is some error in that reasoning, which leads us into such difficulties.

This is the objection; let us now consider its solution. It is evident,
that whatever is present to the memory, striking upon the mind with
a vivacity, which resembles an immediate impression, must become of
considerable moment in all the operations of the mind, and must easily
distinguish itself above the mere fictions of the imagination. Of
these impressions or ideas of the memory we form a kind of system,
comprehending whatever we remember to have been present, either to our
internal perception or senses; and every particular of that system,
joined to the present impressions, we are pleased to call a reality.
But the mind stops not here. For finding, that with this system of
perceptions, there is another connected by custom, or if you will, by
the relation of cause or effect, it proceeds to the consideration
of their ideas; and as it feels that it is in a manner necessarily
determined to view these particular ideas, and that the custom or
relation, by which it is determined, admits not of the least change, it
forms them into a new system, which it likewise dignifies with the title
of realities. The first of these systems is the object of the memory and
senses; the second of the judgment.

It is this latter principle, which peoples the world, and brings us
acquainted with such existences, as by their removal in time and place,
lie beyond the reach of the senses and memory. By means of it I paint
the universe in my imagination, and fix my attention on any part of it
I please. I form an idea of ROME, which I neither see nor remember; but
which is connected with such impressions as I remember to have received
from the conversation and books of travellers and historians. This idea
of Rome I place in a certain situation on the idea of an object, which I
call the globe. I join to it the conception of a particular government,
and religion, and manners. I look backward and consider its first
foundation; its several revolutions, successes, and misfortunes. All
this, and everything else, which I believe, are nothing but i