into the reason of the conjunction. We only observe the thing
itself, and always find that from the constant conjunction the objects
acquire an union in the imagination. When the impression of one becomes
present to us, we immediately form an idea of its usual attendant; and
consequently we may establish this as one part of the definition of an
opinion or belief, that it is an idea related to or associated with a
present impression.
Thus though causation be a philosophical relation, as implying
contiguity, succession, and constant conjunction, yet it is only so far
as it is a natural relation, and produces an union among our ideas, that
we are able to reason upon it, or draw any inference from it.
SECT. VII. OF THE NATURE OF THE IDEA OR BELIEF.
The idea of an object is an essential part of the belief of it, but not
the whole. We conceive many things, which we do not believe. In order
then to discover more fully the nature of belief, or the qualities of
those ideas we assent to, let us weigh the following considerations.
It is evident, that all reasonings from causes or effects terminate
in conclusions, concerning matter of fact; that is, concerning the
existence of objects or of their qualities. It is also evident, that the
idea, of existence is nothing different from the idea of any object, and
that when after the simple conception of any thing we would conceive
it as existent, we in reality make no addition to or alteration on our
first idea. Thus when we affirm, that God is existent, we simply
form the idea of such a being, as he is represented to us; nor is the
existence, which we attribute to him, conceived by a particular idea,
which we join to the idea of his other qualities, and can again separate
and distinguish from them. But I go farther; and not content with
asserting, that the conception of the existence of any object is no
addition to the simple conception of it, I likewise maintain, that the
belief of the existence joins no new ideas to those which compose
the idea of the object. When I think of God, when I think of him as
existent, and when I believe him to be existent, my idea of him
neither encreases nor diminishes. But as it is certain there is a great
difference betwixt the simple conception of the existence of an object,
and the belief of it, and as this difference lies not in the parts or
composition of the idea, which we conceive; it follows, that it must lie
in the manner, in which
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