e ideas in both;
though his testimony has not the same influence on them. The latter has
a more lively conception of all the incidents. He enters deeper into
the concerns of the persons: represents to himself their actions, and
characters, and friendships, and enmities: He even goes so far as to
form a notion of their features, and air, and person. While the former,
who gives no credit to the testimony of the author, has a more faint and
languid conception of all these particulars; and except on account
of the style and ingenuity of the composition, can receive little
entertainment from it.

SECT. VIII. OF THE CAUSES OF BELIEF.

Having thus explained the nature of belief, and shewn that it consists
in a lively idea related to a present impression; let us now proceed
to examine from what principles it is derived, and what bestows the
vivacity on the idea.

I would willingly establish it as a general maxim in the science of
human nature, that when any impression becomes present to us, it
not only transports the mind to such ideas as are related to it, but
likewise communicates to them a share of its force and vivacity. All
the operations of the mind depend in a great measure on its disposition,
when it performs them; and according as the spirits are more or less
elevated, and the attention more or less fixed, the action will always
have more or less vigour and vivacity. When therefore any object is
presented, which elevates and enlivens the thought, every action, to
which the mind applies itself, will be more strong and vivid, as Tong
as that disposition continues, Now it is evident the continuance of the
disposition depends entirely on the objects, about which the mind is
employed; and that any new object naturally gives a new direction to the
spirits, and changes the disposition; as on the contrary, when the mind
fixes constantly on the same object, or passes easily and insensibly
along related objects, the disposition has a much longer duration.
Hence it happens, that when the mind is once inlivened by a present
impression, it proceeds to form a more lively idea of the related
objects, by a natural transition of the disposition from the one to the
other. The change of the objects is so easy, that the mind is scarce
sensible of it, but applies itself to the conception of the related idea
with all the force and vivacity it acquired from the present impression.

If in considering the nature of relation, and th