ce
decides nothing in the present case; and at the utmost can only prove,
that that very object, which produced any other, was at that very
instant endowed with such a power; but can never prove, that the
same power must continue in the same object or collection of sensible
qualities; much less, that a like power is always conjoined with like
sensible qualities, should it be said, that we have experience, that the
same power continues united with the same object, and that like objects
are endowed with like powers, I would renew my question, why from this
experience we form any conclusion beyond those past instances, of which
we have had experience. If you answer this question in, the same manner
as the preceding, your answer gives still occasion to a new question
of the same kind, even in infinitum; which clearly proves, that the
foregoing reasoning had no just foundation.
Thus not only our reason fails us in the discovery of the ultimate
connexion of causes and effects, but even after experience has informed
us of their constant conjunction, it is impossible for us to satisfy
ourselves by our reason, why we should extend that experience beyond
those particular instances, which have fallen under our observation. We
suppose, but are never able to prove, that there must be a resemblance
betwixt those objects, of which we have had experience, and those which
lie beyond the reach of our discovery.
We have already taken notice of certain relations, which make us pass
from one object to another, even though there be no reason to determine
us to that transition; and this we may establish for a general rule,
that wherever the mind constantly and uniformly makes a transition
without any reason, it is influenced by these relations. Now this is
exactly the present case. Reason can never shew us the connexion of one
object with another, though aided by experience, and the observation
of their constant conjunction in all past instances. When the mind,
therefore, passes from the idea or impression of one object to the idea
or belief of another, it is not determined by reason, but by certain
principles, which associate together the ideas of these objects, and
unite them in the imagination. Had ideas no more union in the fancy
than objects seem to have to the understanding, we coued never draw any
inference from causes to effects, nor repose belief in any matter of
fact. The inference, therefore, depends solely on the union of ideas
|