Now, it seems to me that the responsibility for this lack of boats,
which came near ruining the expedition at the outset and which hampered
and embarrassed it for three weeks afterward, can be definitely fixed.
The difficulty to be overcome was one that might have been foreseen and
provided for. If General Shafter did not foresee and provide for it, as
General Scott did at Vera Cruz, he, manifestly, is the person to blame;
while, on the other hand, if he did foresee it, but failed to get from
the War Department the necessary boats, the department is to blame. The
committee of investigation which is holding its sessions at the time
this book goes to press ought to have no trouble in putting the
responsibility for this deficiency where it belongs.
Boats, however, were not the only things that were lacking in the
equipment of General Shafter's army. Next in importance to landing
facilities come facilities for moving supplies of all kinds from the
sea-coast to the front, or, in other words, means of land
transportation. In his official report of the campaign General Shafter
says: "There was no lack of transportation, for at no time, up to the
surrender, could all the wagons I had be used." If I were disposed to be
captious, I should say that the reason why the general could not use the
wagons he had was that a large number of them lay untouched in the holds
of the transports. He might have said, with equal cogency, that there
was no lack of food, because at no time could all the hard bread and
bacon in his ships be eaten. The usefulness of food and wagons is
dependent to some extent upon their location. A superfluity of wagons on
board a steamer, five miles at sea, is not necessarily a proof that
there are more than enough wagons on shore.
When the army began its march in the direction of Santiago, without
suitable tents, without hospital supplies, without camp-kettles, without
hammocks, without extra clothing or spare blankets, and with only a
limited supply of food and ammunition, there were one hundred and
eighteen army wagons still on board the transport _Cherokee_. When they
were unloaded, if ever, I do not know, but they were not available in
the first week of the campaign, when the army began its advance and when
the roads were comparatively dry and in fairly good condition. It must
be observed, moreover, that transportation is not wholly a matter of
wagons. Vehicles of any kind are useless without animals to dr
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