mp-kettles, without cooking-utensils, without
hammocks, without extra clothing or spare blankets, and with only a
limited supply of food? The answer to the question, it seems to me, is
obvious. The army had not half transportation enough to supply its
wants. General Miles discovered this fact when he reached Siboney on
July 11, and he immediately cabled the War Department for more
draft-animals; but it was then too late to make good the deficiency. The
troops were already breaking down, as General Shafter admitted in his
telegram to the President, from "twenty days of meat, bread, and coffee,
without change of clothes, and without any shelter whatever." I do not
know how many draft-animals General Shafter had; but in four journeys
over the road between Siboney and the front I happened to see only two
pack-trains, one of them going forward with ammunition, and the other
returning without load. But whatever may have been the strength of the
pack-train equipment, it was certainly inadequate, and the common
practice of detailing soldiers to march into Siboney after food and
bring it back to the front on their shoulders or on improvised
hand-litters showed the urgency of the need. Many such details or
deputations came on board the _State of Texas_, obtained small
quantities of hospital supplies or delicacies for the sick, and carried
them back to the camps in their hands.

This inadequacy of transportation facilities was apparent to every one
who had any knowledge of the condition of the army, and it was a
subject of common talk in Siboney, in Daiquiri, on board the fleet, and
in every one of our hospitals and camps. I shall try, in another
chapter, to show how it affected the health and fighting efficiency of
the troops, and how near it came to wrecking not only the Fifth
Army-Corps, but the whole Cuban expedition. Suffice it to say, for the
present, that General Shafter sailed from Tampa without a sufficient
number of mules, teamsters, and packers to supply, equip, and maintain
his army in the field. The responsibility for this deficiency, as well
as the responsibility for the lack of boats, must rest either upon the
War Department or upon the general in command. If the latter did not ask
for adequate means of land and water transportation before he left
Tampa, he is the person to be held accountable. If he asked and failed
to obtain, the War Department must stand in the gap.

CHAPTER XX

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN (_C