with the assistance of the latter, was to capture the old Aguadores fort
and such other intrenchments as should be found at the mouth of the
Aguadores ravine. This, it was thought, might be accomplished with very
little loss, because the fleet could shell the Spaniards out of their
fortifications, and thus make it possible for the army to occupy them
without much fighting. Having taken Aguadores, General Shafter was to
continue his march westward along the coast, still under the protection
of Admiral Sampson's guns, until he reached Morro. Then, without
attempting to storm or reduce the castle, he was to go down through the
ravine that leads to the head of the Estrella cove, and seize the
submarine-mine station at the mouth of Santiago harbor. When electrical
connection between the station and the mines had been destroyed, and the
mines had thus been rendered harmless, Admiral Sampson was to force an
entrance, fighting his way in past the batteries, and the army and fleet
were then to advance northward toward the city along the eastern side of
the bay.

This plan had many obvious advantages, the most important of which was
the aid and protection that would be given to the army, at every stage
of its progress, by the guns of perhaps thirty or forty ships of war. In
the opinion of naval officers, Admiral Sampson's cruisers and
battle-ships could sweep the country ahead of our advance with such a
storm of shot and shell that the Spaniards would not be able to hold any
position within a mile of the coast. All that the army would have to do,
therefore, would be to occupy the country as fast as it was cleared by
the fire of the fleet, and then open the harbor to the latter by cutting
communication with the submarine mines which were the only effective
defense that the city had on the water side. General Shafter's army,
moreover, would be all the time on high, sea-breeze-swept land, and
therefore comparatively safe from malarial fever, and it would not only
have a railroad behind it for the transportation of its supplies, but be
constantly within easy reach of its base by water.

Why this plan was eventually given up I do not know. In abandoning it
General Shafter voluntarily deprived himself of the aid that might have
been rendered by three or four hundred high-powered and rapid-fire guns,
backed by a trained fighting force of six or eight thousand men. I do
not know the exact strength of Sampson's and Schley's combined flee