n
any event, for the reason that the surrounding country was almost wholly
destitute of food, and General Linares, in the hurry and confusion of
defeat, would hardly have been able to organize a provision-train for an
army of eight or ten thousand men, even if he had had provisions to
carry. The only place where he could hope to find food in any quantity
was Manzanillo, and to reach that port he would have had to make a
forced march of from twelve to fifteen days. But the question whether
the interior line of advance or the coastline was the better must be
left to strategists, and I express no opinion with regard to it.

The operations and manoeuvers of our army in front of Santiago have
already been described and commented upon by a number of expert
observers, and the only additional criticisms that I have to make relate
to General Shafter's neglect of reconnaissances, as a means of
ascertaining the enemy's strength and position; his apparent loss of
grip after the battle of July 1-2; and his failure not only to prevent,
but to take any adequate steps to prevent, the reinforcement of the
Santiago garrison by a column of five thousand regulars from Manzanillo
under command of Colonel Escarrio. If I am correctly informed, the only
reconnaissances made from the front of our army, after it came within
striking distance of the enemy's intrenched line, were made by General
Chaffee and a few other commanding officers upon their own
responsibility and for their own information. General Shafter knew
little more about the topography of the country in front of his advance
picket-line than could be ascertained by mere inspection from the top of
a hill. He received information to the effect that General Pando, with a
strong column of Spanish regulars, was approaching Santiago from the
direction of Manzanillo; but he never took any adequate steps to
ascertain where General Pando was, when and by what road he might be
expected to arrive, or how many men he was bringing with him. In the
course of a single day--July 3--General Shafter sent three telegrams to
the War Department with regard to the whereabouts of Pando, in each of
which he located that officer in a different place. In the first he
says: "Pando has arrived at Palma" (a village about twenty-five miles
northwest of Santiago on the Cobre road). In the second he declares that
Pando is "six miles north of Santiago," "near a break in the [San Luis]
railroad," and that he thinks