an interview published in the New York
"Tribune" of September 14, 1898, explains the apparent indifference of
General Shafter to the approach of these reinforcements as follows: "In
regard to the Cubans allowing the Spanish reinforcements to enter
Santiago from Manzanillo, I would say that I met General Shafter on
board the _Vixen_, and from my conversation with him I infer that he
intended to allow the Spaniards to enter the city, so as to have them
where he could punish them more."

It is to be hoped that General Howard misunderstood General Shafter,
because such strategy as that indicated would suggest the tactics of the
pugnacious John Phoenix, who, in a fight in the editorial room, put
his nose into the mouth of his adversary in order to hold the latter
more securely.

The explanation of the entrance of the Spanish reinforcements given by
General Shafter in his official report of the campaign is as follows:
"General Garcia, with between four and five thousand Cubans, was
intrusted with the duty of watching for and intercepting the
reinforcements expected. This, however, he failed to do, and Escarrio
passed into the city along my extreme right and near the bay."

General Garcia himself, however, in his report to his own government,
states that he was directed by General Shafter to occupy and hold a
certain position on the right wing of the army, and that, without
disobeying orders and leaving that position, he could not possibly
intercept the Manzanillo troops.

As it happened, Escarrio's column did not become a controlling or
decisive factor in the campaign, and the question why he was allowed to
reinforce the Santiago garrison has therefore only a speculative
interest. If, however, these reinforcements had happened to arrive two
days earlier--in time to take part in the battle of July 1-2--the whole
course of events might have been changed. The Spanish garrison of the
city, according to the English cable-operators and the foreign
residents, consisted of three thousand regulars, one thousand
volunteers, and about one thousand sailors and marines from Cervera's
fleet--a force, all together, of not more than five thousand men. This
comparatively small army, fighting in intrenchments and in almost
impregnable positions, came so near repulsing our attack on July 1 that
General Shafter "seriously considered the advisability of falling back
to a position five miles in the rear." If the five thousand men in the
Span