mber of sick and wounded; he is the man who makes
requisition upon the War Department for transports, mules, and wagons
enough to carry the army and its equipment to the field where it is to
operate; and he is the man who should consider all contingencies and
emergencies likely to arise as a result of climatic or other local
conditions, and who should see that ample provision is made for them.
General Shafter says that "no one could have foreseen all that would be
required." That is probably true; but any one, it seems to me, could
have foreseen that an army of sixteen thousand men, which was expected
to attack intrenched positions, would need more than three ambulances
for the transportation of the wounded, to say nothing of the sick. The
same remark applies to medicines and medical supplies. Every one knew
that our army was going to a very unhealthful region, and it was not
difficult to foresee that it would require perhaps two or three times
the quantity of medical supplies that would be needed in a temperate
climate and a more healthful environment. The very reason assigned for
General Shafter's hurried advance toward Santiago is that he knew his
army would soon be disabled by disease, and wished to strike a decisive
blow while his men were still able to fight. If he anticipated the
wrecking of his army by sickness that could not be averted nor long
delayed, why did he not make sure, before he left Tampa, that he had
medical supplies and hospital facilities enough to meet the inevitable
emergency? His telegram to Adjutant-General Corbin seems to indicate
that he was not only unprepared for an emergency, but unprepared to meet
even the ordinary demands of an army in the field, inasmuch as he
declares, without limitation or qualification, that from June 14 to
August 3 he never had medicines enough for the daily wants of his
command.

It may be thought that the view here taken of the responsibility of the
commanding general for everything that pertains to the well-being and
the fighting efficiency of his command is too extreme and exacting, and
that he ought not to be held personally accountable for the mistakes or
the incompetence of his staff-officers. Waiving a discussion of this
question on its merits, it need only be said that, inasmuch as General
Shafter has officially recommended all of his staff-officers for
promotion on account of "faithful and meritorious services throughout
the campaign," he is estopped from