aw them;
and General Shafter does not anywhere say that he had a superfluity of
mules, or that he could not use all the horses he had. It was in
draft-animals that the weakness of the quartermaster's department became
most apparent as the campaign progressed. There were never half enough
mules to equip an adequate supply-train for an army of sixteen thousand
men, even if that army never went more than ten or twelve miles from its
base. If it had been forced to go fifty miles from its base, the
campaign would have collapsed at the outset.
General Shafter seems disposed to attribute the difficulty that he
experienced in supplying his army with food to the condition of the
roads rather than to the lack of mules, packers, teamsters, and wagons.
In an interview with a correspondent of the Boston "Herald" at Santiago
on August 25 he is reported as saying: "There has been some question
concerning the transportation facilities of the army. The facilities
were all there, and the transportation equipment provided was all that
it should have been; but our difficulties were enormous. There was only
one road; to build another would have taken two years. The nature of the
country, the weather, all these things helped to disorganize this
department. The use of wagons was almost impossible. The pack-train, as
a matter of fact, did the real service. I had not, at first, thought the
pack-train would be of service; but if it had not been there, I do not
know what the army would have done for food. The roads were practically
impassable. With the bridges down, the wagons could not be worked. I had
a great deal of concern when we were only able to get up one day's
rations at a time, but as soon as we were able to get a few days'
rations ahead, we knew we were prepared for anything."
It is hardly accurate to say, without qualification and without
limitation as to time, that the "roads were practically impassable."
They were unquestionably very bad, and perhaps impassable, at the last;
but before they became so there was ample time to take over them, with a
suitable supply-train, all the tents, cooking-utensils, clothing,
medical supplies, and provisions that the army so urgently needed but
did not have. The road from Daiquiri and Siboney to the front did not
become impassable for loaded wagons until the end of the second week in
July. For ten days after the army landed it was comparatively dry and
good; and for ten days or two weeks more i
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