ption he was unquestionably responsible for the whole Santiago
campaign, and must not only be given credit for the success that crowned
it, but be held accountable for the blunders and oversights by which it
was marred. He can relieve himself from such accountability only by
showing that his equipment was inadequate and that the inadequacy was
the result of causes beyond his control.

We are now prepared to consider:

I. The organization and equipment of the Santiago expedition.

When a general is appointed to lead and direct an expedition in a
foreign country, the first questions, I think, that he must ask himself
are: (1) What is the nature of the field in which I am to operate, and
what are the difficulties--especially the unusual and unfamiliar
difficulties--with which I shall have to contend? (2) Can I disembark my
army in a harbor, or shall I have to land it on an open, unprotected
coast, and perhaps through surf? (3) Are there any roads leading back
into the interior, and, if so, what is their nature, and what is likely
to be their condition at this season of the year? (4) Is the climate of
the country to which I am going an unhealthful one, and, if so, how can
I best protect my men from the diseases likely to attack them?

It is not always practicable to obtain satisfactory answers to such
questions as these; but that answers should be had, if possible, and
that the equipment of the force and the plan of campaign should be made
to accord with the information obtained by means of them, is
unquestionable. In the particular case now under consideration there was
no difficulty whatever in getting full and satisfactory replies, not
only to all of the above questions, but to scores of others of a similar
nature that might have been and ought to have been asked. For nearly a
month before General Shafter sailed from Tampa the vessels of Admiral
Sampson's fleet had been patrolling the southeastern coast of Cuba from
Santiago harbor to Guantanamo Bay, and their officers were in a position
to furnish all the information that might be desired with regard to the
nature of the coast, the facilities for landing an army, the strength
and direction of the prevailing winds, the danger to be apprehended from
heavy surf, and a dozen other matters of vital importance to an invading
army. At Daiquiri, Siboney, and Santiago there were stations of an
American iron-mining company, and its officers and employees, who might
easily have