sses sentiments, in which he expects all his audience are to
concur with him. He must here, therefore, depart from his private and
particular situation, and must choose a point of view, common to him
with others; he must move some universal principle of the human frame,
and touch a string to which all mankind have an accord and symphony. If
he mean, therefore, to express that this man possesses qualities, whose
tendency is pernicious to society, he has chosen this common point of
view, and has touched the principle of humanity, in which every man, in
some degree, concurs. While the human heart is compounded of the same
elements as at present, it will never be wholly indifferent to public
good, nor entirely unaffected with the tendency of characters and
manners. And though this affection of humanity may not generally be
esteemed so strong as vanity or ambition, yet, being common to all men,
it can alone be the foundation of morals, or of any-general system of
blame or praise. One man's ambition is not another's ambition, nor will
the same event or object satisfy both; but the humanity of one man is
the humanity of every one, and the same object touches this passion in
all human creatures.

But the sentiments, which arise from humanity, are not only the same in
all human creatures, and produce the same approbation or censure; but
they also comprehend all human creatures; nor is there any one whose
conduct or character is not, by their means, an object to every one of
censure or approbation. On the contrary, those other passions,
commonly denominated selfish, both produce different sentiments in each
individual, according to his particular situation; and also contemplate
the greater part of mankind with the utmost indifference and unconcern.
Whoever has a high regard and esteem for me flatters my vanity; whoever
expresses contempt mortifies and displeases me; but as my name is known
but to a small part of mankind, there are few who come within the sphere
of this passion, or excite, on its account, either my affection or
disgust. But if you represent a tyrannical, insolent, or barbarous
behaviour, in any country or in any age of the world, I soon carry my
eye to the pernicious tendency of such a conduct, and feel the sentiment
of repugnance and displeasure towards it. No character can be so remote
as to be, in this light, wholly indifferent to me. What is beneficial
to society or to the person himself must still be preferred