ORD, or disputing whether
they be entitled to the denomination of virtues? It may, indeed,
be pretended, that the sentiment of approbation, which those
accomplishments produce, besides its being INFERIOR, is also somewhat
DIFFERENT from that which attends the virtues of justice and humanity.
But this seems not a sufficient reason for ranking them entirely under
different classes and appellations. The character of Caesar and that of
Cato, as drawn by Sallust, are both of them virtuous, in the strictest
and most limited sense of the word; but in a different way: nor are the
sentiments entirely the same which arise from them. The one produces
love, the other esteem: the one is amiable, the other awful: we should
wish to meet the one character in a friend; the other we should be
ambitious of in ourselves. In like manner the approbation, which attends
temperance or industry or frugality, may be somewhat different from that
which is paid to the social virtues, without making them entirely of a
different species. And, indeed, we may observe, that these endowments,
more than the other virtues, produce not, all of them, the same kind
of approbation. Good sense and genius beget esteem and regard: wit and
humour excite love and affection.
[Footnote: Love and esteem are nearly the same passion, and arise
from similar causes. The qualities, which produce both, are such as
communicate pleasures. But where this pleasure is severe and serious;
or where its object is great, and makes a strong impression, or where
it produces any degree of humility and awe; in all these cases, the
passion, which arises from the pleasure, is more properly denominated
esteem than love. Benevolence attends both; but is connected with love
in a more eminent degree. There seems to be still a stronger mixture of
pride in contempt than of humility in esteem; and the reason would not
be difficulty to one, who studied accurately the passions. All these
various mixtures and compositions and appearances of sentiment from
a very curious subject of speculation, but are wide for our present
purpose. Throughout this enquiry, we always consider in general, what
qualities are a subject of praise or of censure, without entering
into all the minute differences of sentiment, which they excite. It is
evident, that whatever is contemned, is also disliked, as well as what
is hated; and we here endeavour to take objects, according to their most
simple views and appearan
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