asque in vulnere ponunt. VIRG, Dum alteri noceat,
sui negligens says Seneca of Anger. De Ira, I. i.] and what a malignant
philosophy must it be, that will not allow to humanity and friendship
the same privileges which are undisputably granted to the darker
passions of enmity and resentment; such a philosophy is more like a
satyr than a true delineation or description of human nature; and may
be a good foundation for paradoxical wit and raillery, but is a very bad
one for any serious argument or reasoning.
APPENDIX III. SOME FARTHER CONSIDERATIONS WITH REGARD TO JUSTICE.
The intention of this Appendix is to give some more particular
explication of the origin and nature of Justice, and to mark some
differences between it and the other virtues.
The social virtues of humanity and benevolence exert their influence
immediately by a direct tendency or instinct, which chiefly keeps in
view the simple object, moving the affections, and comprehends not any
scheme or system, nor the consequences resulting from the concurrence,
imitation, or example of others. A parent flies to the relief of his
child; transported by that natural sympathy which actuates him, and
which affords no leisure to reflect on the sentiments or conduct of
the rest of mankind in like circumstances. A generous man cheerfully
embraces an opportunity of serving his friend; because he then feels
himself under the dominion of the beneficent affections, nor is he
concerned whether any other person in the universe were ever before
actuated by such noble motives, or will ever afterwards prove their
influence. In all these cases the social passions have in view a single
individual object, and pursue the safety or happiness alone of the
person loved and esteemed. With this they are satisfied: in this they
acquiesce. And as the good, resulting from their benign influence, is
in itself complete and entire, it also excites the moral sentiment of
approbation, without any reflection on farther consequences, and without
any more enlarged views of the concurrence or imitation of the other
members of society. On the contrary, were the generous friend or
disinterested patriot to stand alone in the practice of beneficence,
this would rather enhance his value in our eyes, and join the praise of
rarity and novelty to his other more exalted merits.
The case is not the same with the social virtues of justice and
fidelity. They are highly useful, or indeed absolutely
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