al
object of all courts of judicature; and this utility too requires a
stable rule in all controversies: but where several rules, nearly equal
and indifferent, present themselves, it is a very slight turn of thought
which fixes the decision in favour of either party.

[Footnote: That there be a separation or distinction of
possessions, and that this separation be steady and
constant; this is absolutely required by the interests of
society, and hence the origin of justice and property. What
possessions are assigned to particular persons; this is,
generally speaking, pretty indifferent; and is often
determined by very frivolous views and considerations. We
shall mention a few particulars.

Were a society formed among several independent members, the
most obvious rule, which could be agreed on, would be to
annex property to PRESENT possession, and leave every one a
right to what he at present enjoys. The relation of
possession, which takes place between the person and the
object, naturally draws on the relation of property.

For a like reason, occupation or first possession becomes
the foundation of property.

Where a man bestows labour and industry upon any object,
which before belonged to no body; as in cutting down and
shaping a tree, in cultivating a field, &c., the
alterations, which he produces, causes a relation between
him and the object, and naturally engages us to annex it to
him by the new relation of property. This cause here concurs
with the public utility, which consists in the encouragement
given to industry and labour.

Perhaps too, private humanity towards the possessor concurs,
in this instance, with the other motives, and engages us to
leave with him what he has acquired by his sweat and labour;
and what he has flattered himself in the constant enjoyment
of. For though private humanity can, by no means, be the
origin of justice; since the latter virtue so often
contradicts the former; yet when the rule of separate and
constant possession is once formed by the indispensable
necessities of society, private humanity, and an aversion to
the doing a hardship to another, may, in a particular
instance, give rise to a particular rule of property.

I am much inclined to think, that the right succession or
inheritance