general utility, the injury, the
hardship, the harm, which result to any individual from a violation of
them, enter very much into consideration, and are a great source of that
universal blame which attends every wrong or iniquity. By the laws of
society, this coat, this horse is mine, and OUGHT to remain perpetually
in my possession: I reckon on the secure enjoyment of it: by depriving
me of it, you disappoint my expectations, and doubly displease me, and
offend every bystander. It is a public wrong, so far as the rules of
equity are violated: it is a private harm, so far as an individual is
injured. And though the second consideration could have no place, were
not the former previously established: for otherwise the distinction of
MINE and THINE would be unknown in society: yet there is no question
but the regard to general good is much enforced by the respect to
particular. What injures the community, without hurting any individual,
is often more lightly thought of. But where the greatest public wrong
is also conjoined with a considerable private one, no wonder the highest
disapprobation attends so iniquitous a behaviour.
APPENDIX IV. OF SOME VERBAL DISPUTES.
Nothing is more usual than for philosophers to encroach upon the
province of grammarians; and to engage in disputes of words, while they
imagine that they are handling controversies of the deepest importance
and concern. It was in order to avoid altercations, so frivolous and
endless, that I endeavoured to state with the utmost caution the object
of our present enquiry; and proposed simply to collect, on the one hand,
a list of those mental qualities which are the object of love or esteem,
and form a part of personal merit; and on the other hand, a catalogue of
those qualities which are the object of censure or reproach, and which
detract from the character of the person possessed of them; subjoining
some reflections concerning the origin of these sentiments of praise or
blame. On all occasions, where there might arise the least hesitation,
I avoided the terms VIRTUE and VICE; because some of those qualities,
which I classed among the objects of praise, receive, in the English
language, the appellation of TALENTS, rather than of virtues; as some of
the blameable or censurable qualities are often called defects, rather
than vices. It may now, perhaps, be expected that before we conclude
this moral enquiry, we should exactly separate the one from the
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