other;
should mark the precise boundaries of virtues and talents, vices and
defects; and should explain the reason and origin of that distinction.
But in order to excuse myself from this undertaking, which would,
at last, prove only a grammatical enquiry, I shall subjoin the four
following reflections, which shall contain all that I intend to say on
the present subject.

First, I do not find that in the English, or any other modern tongue,
the boundaries are exactly fixed between virtues and talents, vices
and defects, or that a precise definition can be given of the one as
contradistinguished from the other. Were we to say, for instance, that
the esteemable qualities alone, which are voluntary, are entitled to
the appellations of virtues; we should soon recollect the qualities of
courage, equanimity, patience, self-command; with many others, which
almost every language classes under this appellation, though they depend
little or not at all on our choice. Should we affirm that the qualities
alone, which prompt us to act our part in society, are entitled to that
honourable distinction; it must immediately occur that these are indeed
the most valuable qualities, and are commonly denominated the SOCIAL
virtues; but that this very epithet supposes that there are also virtues
of another species. Should we lay hold of the distinction between
INTELLECTUAL and MORAL endowments, and affirm the last alone to be the
real and genuine virtues, because they alone lead to action; we should
find that many of those qualities, usually called intellectual virtues,
such as prudence, penetration, discernment, discretion, had also a
considerable influence on conduct. The distinction between the heart and
the head may also be adopted: the qualities of the first may be defined
such as in their immediate exertion are accompanied with a feeling
of sentiment; and these alone may be called the genuine virtues: but
industry, frugality, temperance, secrecy, perseverance, and many other
laudable powers or habits, generally stilled virtues are exerted without
any immediate sentiment in the person possessed of them, and are only
known to him by their effects. It is fortunate, amidst all this seeming
perplexity, that the question, being merely verbal, cannot possibly be
of any importance. A moral, philosophical discourse needs not enter
into all these caprices of language, which are so variable in different
dialects, and in different ages of the same di